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read conjointly, it appears that the instant case is not one of testimonial compulsion and should have been decided on that ground.
It is submitted that legislation should be enacted to bring the
testimony of any witness disclosing a communication between a lawyer
and his client within the sweep of the attorney-client privilege, if it
came to the knowledge of such witness in a manner not reasonably
to be anticipated by the client.

CITIZENS AND

CITIZENSHIP

-

NATURALIZATION -

EXEMPTION

FROM MILITARY SERVICE OATH ON BASIS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF

UPHELD.-An alien seeking naturalization petitioned to be exempted

from taking the military service oath. He claimed to fulfill the statutory requirement of being opposed to service by reason of "religious
training and belief." Although it was found that his belief was not
based on any "religious training," the District Court granted the
petition holding that petitioner need show only that his beliefs are in
relation to a Supreme Being. In re Hansen, 148 F. Supp. 187
(D. Minn. 1957).
Before being admitted to citizenship, an alien is required by the
Immigration and Nationality Act' to take an oath in open court.
Petitioner seeks the conscientious objector exemption provided by the
Act which would excuse him from swearing to perform military
service and would require him to swear only "to perform work of
national importance under civilian direction when required by law." 2
Conscientious objection is now recognized under both the Universal
Military Training and Service Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act.3 The definition of a conscientious objector is the same in
both: a person who by reason of "religious training and belief" is
opposed to any type of service in the armed forces. Further, the term
lImmigration and Nationality Act §337(a),

§ 1448(a) (1952).

66 STAT. 258, 8

U.S.C.

2Ibid.
3 Prior to 1946, conscientious objectors could not become naturalized citizens
since it was held that the oath of allegiance required, as a prerequisite to
naturalization, that petitioner promise to bear arms in defense of the United
States. United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931); United States v.
Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); United States v. Schwimmer. 279 U.S. 644
(1929). At that time the oath read: ' . . that he will support and defend
the Constitution and Laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign
and domestic and bear true faith and allegiance to the same." 34 STAT. 598
(1906). These cases were overruled by United States v. Girouard, 328 U.S. 61
(1946), which changed the accepted meaning of the oath so as to exclude the
promise to bear arms in defense of this country. The act was amended in 1950
to read substantially as it does today. See note 1 supra.
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"religious training and belief" is defined as "an individual's belief in
a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code." 4
The present case considers the meaning of the word "training" in
that definition. 5
An apparent conflict is developing among the federal circuit
courts as to whether a registrant's "training" must be the basis for
his "belief." In a tenth circuit case,6 a registrant claimed a total
exemption, i.e., an exemption from combatant and non-combatant
service, stating that his beliefs were based on the teachings of the
Church of Christ and a certain minister in that church. When investigation disclosed that the minister taught that non-combatant
service was not wrong, the registrant was denied a total exemption.
In Roberson v. United States 7 decided in the same circuit, another
member of the Church of Christ was denied a total exemption because
of his indecision whether to accept non-combatant service or to insist
on a total exemption. In its opinion resolving his uncertainty in
favor of the government that court said, "we do not think his right
to exemption under the law can rise above the tenets of his faith as
taught by the church through which he finds spiritual expression." 8
In the seventh circuit, a District Court held 9 that it was insufficient for the petitioner to show merely that he belonged to a church
which would support him in his own individual belief whether he
believed in military service or was a conscientious objector. The
court stated that to allow exemptions to members of such a church
"would open the door to chaos and fraud in the administration of the
Selective Service Act and would in effect repeal the whole Act and
leave military service upon a voluntary basis." 1 0
In other circuits a different view is held. A District Court for
the fourth circuit held that the denial of a conscientious objector's
4 Compare Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62

STAT.

612-13

(1948), 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1952), with Immigration and Nationality Act,
66 STAT. 258-59, 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1952). This definition follows closely
the famous definition of religion given by Chief Justice Hughes in United
States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 634-35 (1931) (dissenting opinion).
5Other courts have previously considered the definition. See. e..g., United
States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943), which said
opposition must be traceable to some religious training or belief, and United
States v. Berman, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946), which commented that registrant had not shown either training or belief. Both cases were decided before
Congress defined "religious training and belief" in the Selective Service Act
of 1948. But see United States v. Delime, 121 F. Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1954),
aff'd on other grounds, 223 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1955), decided under the present
draft law.
6 Head v. United States, 199 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1952).
7 208 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1953).
8 Roberson

v. United States, 208 F.2d 166, 169 (10th Cir. 1953).

9 United States v. Hein, 112 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ill. 1953).
'oId. at 75.

1957]

RECENT DECISIONS

classification to a petitioner solely because he was a Catholic, without
regard to his training and belief, was a denial of due process."' In
the first circuit Judge Aldrich granted a motion for reconsideration
of In re Nissen,12 a naturalization case, in which he had held that
training without belief is not enough neither is belief
just as "...
. . without training." "I In that case the petitioner, a member of
the Lutheran faith, asserted he believed that it was wrong to bear
arms. However, this belief was not due to any teaching or training
that he received. It was his own belief rather than the doctrine of
the church. After a re-examination of the problem Judge Aldrich,
granting the motion for reconsideration, concluded that ". . . so far
as Congress was thinking of training it regarded it as meaning no
more than individual experience supporting belief; a mere background
against which sincerity could be tested." '4 In the instant case, 15 the
District Court for the eighth circuit, citing the Nissen case, held that
"religious training and belief" was a single concept and not properly
severable, and that petitioner need only show his beliefs were in relation to a Supreme Being.
A comparison of the views shows that under the rule in the
Roberson case, if the petitioner did belong to a sect, it would have to
be a pacifist sect to qualify him for an exemption. This would be a
reversion to the 1917 draft law which allowed exemption only to
members of recognized pacifist sects.' 8 However, such affiliation has
not been required since the draft law was changed in 1940 to'make
the registrant's own "religious training and belief" the test.1 7 Still,
the Roberson case would not be quite so narrow as the 1917 law in
that a registrant who did not belong to any sect might qualify for
an exemption. It is not clear how cases would be decided under the
holding of the Roberson case where a registrant belonged to a church
that had no policy on conscientious objection, or where the church,
although not teaching conscientious objection, allowed it.
The holding in the instant case reduces the significance of the
word "training" as used in the statute to a minimum. In construing
the statute as a whole, this interpretation would seem to be necessary
to give effect to the intent of Congress.
*

11 United States v. Everngam, 102 F. Supp. 128 (S.D. W. Va. 1951).
2
1 11; re Nissen, 138 F. Supp. 483 (D. Mass.), reconsiderationgranted, 146
F. Supp.
361 (D. Mvass. 1956).
1
3 In re Nissen, 138 F. Supp. 483, 485 (D. Mass. 1956).
"4In re Nissen, 146 F. Supp. 361, 363 (D. Mass. 1956).
I1 In re Hansen, 148 F. Supp. 187 (D. Minn. 1957).
1640 STAT. 76 (1917).

The exemptions were given to "...
any person
. ho is found to be a member of any well recognized religious sect or
organization at present organized and existing and whose existing creed or
principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form and whose religious convictions are against war or participation therein in accordance with
the creed or principles of said religious organizations. .. " Id. at 78.
17Selective Service Act of 1940 §5(9), 54 STAT. 889, 50 U.S.C. APP.

§305(g) (1946).
See also United States v. Bowles, 319 U.S. 34 (1943);
United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1942).

